

Algorithmic Logic-Based Verification with SeaHorn

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

based on work with Teme Kahsai, Jorge Navas, Anvesh
Komuravelli, Jeffrey Gennari, Ed Schwartz, and many others

...



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Automated Software Analysis






Turing, 1936: “undecidable”

Turing, 1949

Alan M. Turing. "Checking a large routine", 1949

How can one check a routine in the sense of making sure that it is right?

programmer should make a number of definite assertions which can be checked individually, and from which the correctness of the whole programme easily follows.



Automated Verification


Deductive Verification


- A user provides a program and a verification certificate
 - e.g., inductive invariant, pre- and post-conditions, function summaries, etc.
- A tool automatically checks validity of the certificate
 - this is not easy! (might even be undecidable)
- Verification is manual but machine certified

Algorithmic Verification

- A user provides a program and a desired specification
 - e.g., program never writes outside of allocated memory
- A tool automatically checks validity of the specification
 - and generates a verification certificate if the program is correct
 - and generates a counterexample if the program is not correct
- Verification is completely automatic – “push-button”

Algorithmic Logic-Based Verification





<http://seahorn.github.io>

**Temesghen
Kahsai
(NASA/CMU)**

**Jorge Navas
(SRI)**



<http://seahorn.github.io>

SeaHorn Usage


Example: in test.c, check that **x is always greater than or equal to y**

test.c

```
extern int nd();
extern void __VERIFIER_error() __attribute__((noreturn));
void assert (int cond) { if (!cond) __VERIFIER_error (); }
int main(){
    int x,y;
    x=1; y=0;
    while (nd ())
    {
        x=x+y;
        y++;
    }
    assert (x>=y);
    return 0;
}
```

SeaHorn command:

```
-> sea pf test.c
```



SeaHorn result:

```
SEAHORN
-----
PROPERTY (line 12) | TRUE
-----
TIME(ms)           | 0.06
```

SeaHorn Philosophy

Build a state-of-the-art Software Model Checker

- useful to “average” users
 - user-friendly, efficient, trusted, certificate-producing, ...
- useful to researchers in verification
 - modular design, clean separation between syntax, semantics, and logic, ...

Stand on the shoulders of giants

- reuse techniques from compiler community to reduce verification effort
 - SSA, loop restructuring, induction variables, alias analysis, ...
 - static analysis and abstract interpretation
- reduce verification to logic
 - verification condition generation
 - Constrained Horn Clauses

Build reusable logic-based verification technology

- “SMT-LIB” for program verification

Three-Layers of a Program Verifier

Compiler



- compiles surface syntax a target machine
- embodies syntax with semantics

Verification Condition Generator


- transforms a program and a property to a verification condition in logic
- employs different abstractions, refinements, proof-search strategies, etc.

Automated Theorem Prover / Reasoning Engine

- discharges verification conditions
- general purpose constraint solver
- SAT, SMT, Abstract Interpreter, Temporal Logic Model Checker,...




SeaHorn Architecture





DEMO

Property-Directed Test-Case Generation



A Counterexample Harness

```
if (get_input() == 0x1234 &&
    get_input() == 0x8765) {
    __VERIFIER_error();
} else {
    return 0;
}
```

get_input() is an external function

Program considered buggy if and only if __VERIFIER_error() is reachable

```
void __get_input() {
    static int x = 0;
    switch (x++) {
        case 0: return 0x1234;
        case 1: return 0x8765;
        default: return 0; }
}
```

Implementation of external functions linked to original source code

Causes program to execute __VERIFIER_error()

Generating Harnesses for Linux Device Drivers

```
void *ldv_ptr(void)
{
    void *tmp;
    tmp = __c();
    return tmp;
}


...

void *is_got = ldv_ptr();
if (is_got <= (long)2012)
{ ... }
```

- Sample from Linux Device Verification (LDV) project¹
- Harness functions returning pointers are tricky
 - May not be reasonable addresses
 - Might return “new” memory
- Original program instrumented with memory read/store hooks that control access to external memory


¹<http://linuxtesting.org/ldv>

Virtual External Memory



Accesses to external “virtual” memory are mapped to real memory

- opportunistically allocate memory for new accesses
- ignore invalid stores, return a default value for an invalid load




Spacer

SMT-BASED DECISION PROCEDURE FOR DECIDING CHC


Safety Verification Problem

Is Bad reachable?



Safety Verification Problem


Is Bad reachable?



Yes. There is a counterexample!

Safety Verification Problem

Is Bad reachable?



No. There is an inductive invariant

Symbolic Reachability Problem

$$P = (V, \textit{Init}, \textit{Tr}, \textit{Bad})$$

P is UNSAFE if and only if there exists a number N s.t.

$$\textit{Init}(X_0) \wedge \left(\bigwedge_{i=0}^{N-1} \textit{Tr}(X_i, X_{i+1}) \right) \wedge \textit{Bad}(X_N) \not\Rightarrow \perp$$

P is SAFE if and only if there exists a *safe inductive invariant* $\textit{Inv}$ s.t.

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \textit{Init} \Rightarrow \textit{Inv} \\ \textit{Inv}(X) \wedge \textit{Tr}(X, X') \Rightarrow \textit{Inv}(X') \\ \textit{Inv} \Rightarrow \neg \textit{Bad} \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} \text{Inductive} \\ \text{Safe} \end{array}$$

Constrained Horn Clauses (CHC)

A Constrained Horn Clause (CHC) is a FOL formula of the form

$$\forall V . (\phi \wedge p_1[X_1] \wedge \dots \wedge p_n[X_n] \rightarrow h[X]),$$

where

- A is a background theory (e.g., Linear Arithmetic, Arrays, Bit-Vectors, or combinations of the above)
- ϕ is a constrained in the background theory A
- $p_1, \dots, p_n, h$ are n-ary predicates
- $p_i[X]$ is an application of a predicate to first-order terms

A **model** of a set of clauses is an interpretation of the predicates p_i and h that makes all clauses **valid**

A set of clauses is **satisfiable** iff it has a model


From Programs to Logic

Program

```

int x = 1;
int y = 0;
while (*) {
    x = x + y;
    y = y + 1;
}
assert(x ≥ y);
    
```


CFG



CHC

- ⟨1⟩ $p_0.$
- ⟨2⟩ $p_1(x, y) \leftarrow p_0, x = 1, y = 0.$
- ⟨3⟩ $p_2(x, y) \leftarrow p_1(x, y).$
- ⟨4⟩ $p_3(x, y) \leftarrow p_1(x, y).$
- ⟨5⟩ $p_1(x', y') \leftarrow p_2(x, y), x' = x + y, y' = y + 1.$
- ⟨6⟩ $p_4 \leftarrow (x \geq y), p_3(x, y).$
- ⟨7⟩ $p_{\text{err}} \leftarrow (x < y), p_3(x, y).$
- ⟨8⟩ $p_4 \leftarrow p_4.$
- ⟨9⟩ $\perp \leftarrow p_{\text{err}}.$

Spacer: Solving SMT-constrained CHC



Spacer: a solver for SMT-constrained Horn Clauses

- stand-alone implementation in a fork of Z3
- <http://bitbucket.org/spacer/code>

Support for Non-Linear CHC

- model procedure summaries in inter-procedural verification conditions
- model assume-guarantee reasoning
- uses MBP to under-approximate models for finite unfoldings of predicates
- uses MAX-SAT to decide on an unfolding strategy

Supported SMT-Theories

- Best-effort support for arbitrary SMT-theories
 - data-structures, bit-vectors, non-linear arithmetic
- Full support for Linear arithmetic (rational and integer)
- Quantifier-free theory of arrays
 - only quantifier free models with limited applications of array equality

The diagram illustrates the iterative process of finding an inductive invariant for a program. It shows three iterations, each starting with a set of program snippets (approx. 1, approx. 2, approx. 3) and a set of lemmas (Lemma1, Lemma2, Lemma3). A solver is applied to each snippet, and the resulting inductive invariant is checked for safety. If the invariant is not safe, the process iterates with a new invariant (approx. 2, approx. 3) and a new set of program snippets. The final invariant (approx. 3) is found to be safe.

```

graph TD
    subgraph Iteration1 [Iteration 1]
        S1[approx. 1] --> S1C[...
        S1C --> S1S[solver]
        S1S --> I1[Inductive Invariant]
        I1 --> D1{Safe?}
        D1 -- No --> Iteration2
    end
    subgraph Iteration2 [Iteration 2]
        S2[approx. 2] --> S2C[...
        S2C --> S2S[solver]
        S2S --> I2[Inductive Invariant]
        I2 --> D2{Safe?}
        D2 -- No --> Iteration3
    end
    subgraph Iteration3 [Iteration 3]
        S3[approx. 3] --> S3C[...
        S3C --> S3S[solver]
        S3S --> I3[Inductive Invariant]
        I3 --> D3{Safe?}
        D3 -- Yes --> End(( ))
    end
  
```

IC3, PDR, and Friends (1)

IC3: A SAT-based Hardware Model Checker

- Incremental Construction of Inductive Clauses for Indubitable Correctness
- A. Bradley: SAT-Based Model Checking without Unrolling. VMCAI 2011

PDR: Explained and extended the implementation

- Property Directed Reachability
- N. Eén, A. Mishchenko, R. K. Brayton: Efficient implementation of property directed reachability. FMCAD 2011

PDR with Predicate Abstraction (easy extension of IC3/PDR to SMT)

- A. Cimatti, A. Griggio, S. Mover, St. Tonetta: IC3 Modulo Theories via Implicit Predicate Abstraction. TACAS 2014
- J. Birgmeier, A. Bradley, G. Weissenbacher: Counterexample to Induction-Guided Abstraction-Refinement (CTIGAR). CAV 2014

IC3, PDR, and Friends (2)

GPDR: Non-Linear CHC with Arithmetic constraints

- Generalized Property Directed Reachability
- K. Hoder and N. Bjørner: Generalized Property Directed Reachability. SAT 2012

SPACER: Non-Linear CHC with Arithmetic

- fixes an incompleteness issue in GPDR and extends it with under-approximate summaries
- A. Komuravelli, A. Gurfinkel, S. Chaki: SMT-Based Model Checking for Recursive Programs. CAV 2014

PolyPDR: Convex models for Linear CHC

- simulating Numeric Abstract Interpretation with PDR
- N. Bjørner and A. Gurfinkel: Property Directed Polyhedral Abstraction. VMCAI 2015

ArrayPDR: CHC with constraints over Arithmetic + Arrays

- Required to model heap manipulating programs
- A. Komuravelli, N. Bjørner, A. Gurfinkel, K. L. McMillan: Compositional Verification of Procedural Programs using Horn Clauses over Integers and Arrays. FMCAD 2015

Algorithm Overview

bounded
safety

Input: Safety problem $\langle \text{Init}(X), \text{Tr}(X, X'), \text{Bad}(X) \rangle$

$F_0 \leftarrow \text{Init} ; N \leftarrow 0$ **repeat**

G $\leftarrow$ PDRMkSAFE($[F_0, \dots, F_N], \text{Bad}$)

if **G** = [] **then return** *Reachable*;

$\forall 0 \leq i \leq N \cdot F_i \leftarrow \mathbf{G}[i]$

$F_0, \dots, F_N \leftarrow \text{PDRPUSH}([F_0, \dots, F_N])$


if $\exists 0 \leq i < N \cdot F_i = F_{i+1}$ **then return** *Unreachable*;

$N \leftarrow N + 1 ; F_N \leftarrow \emptyset$



until ∞ ;

strengthen
result

IC3/PDR In Pictures: MkSafe



IC3/PDR in Pictures: Push




Algorithm Invariants

$$R_i \rightarrow \neg \text{Bad} \quad \text{Init} \rightarrow R_i$$

$$R_i \rightarrow R_{i+1} \quad R_i \wedge \rho \rightarrow R_{i+1}$$

Logic-based Algorithmic Verification



SV-COMP 2015

<http://sv-comp.sosy-lab.org/2015/>

4th Competition on Software Verification held at TACAS 2015

Goals

- Provide a snapshot of the state-of-the-art in software verification to the community.
- Increase the visibility and credits that tool developers receive.
- Establish a set of benchmarks for software verification in the community.


Participants:

- Over 22 participants, including most popular Software Model Checkers and Bounded Model Checkers

Benchmarks:

- C programs with error location (programs include pointers, structures, etc.)
- Over 6,000 files, each 2K – 100K LOC
- Linux Device Drivers, Product Lines, Regressions/Tricky examples
- <http://sv-comp.sosy-lab.org/2015/benchmarks.php>


Results for DeviceDriver category



Applications of SeaHorn at NASA

Absence of Buffer Overflows

- Open source auto-pilots
 - paparazzi and mnav autopilots
- Automatically instrument buffer accesses with runtime checks
- Use SeaHorn to validate that run-time checks never fail
 - slower than pure abstract interpretation
 - BUT, much more precise!



Verify Level 5 requirements of the LADEE software stack

- Manually encode requirements in Simulink model
- Verify that the requirements hold in auto-generated C

Memory safety of C++ controller code

- ongoing...



Conclusion

SeaHorn (<http://seahorn.github.io>)

- a state-of-the-art Software Model Checker
- LLVM-based front-end
- CHC-based verification engine
- a framework for research in logic-based verification



The future

- making SeaHorn useful to the consumers of verification technology
 - counterexamples, build integration, property specification, proofs,
- Concurrent / distributed / embedded systems
 - cyber-physical systems
 - very challenging but there are many opportunities
- richer properties
 - termination[TACAS'16], liveness, synthesis

?

?

?



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IC3/PDR

Input: A safety problem $\langle \text{Init}(X), \text{Tr}(X, X'), \text{Bad}(X) \rangle$.

Output: *Unreachable* or *Reachable*

Data: A cex queue Q , where $c \in Q$ is a pair $\langle m, i \rangle$, m is a cube over state variables, and $i \in \mathbb{N}$. A level N . A trace $F_0, F_1, \dots$

Initially: $Q = \emptyset$, $N = 0$, $F_0 = \text{Init}$, $\forall i > 0 \cdot F_i = \emptyset$.

repeat

Unreachable If there is an $i < N$ s.t. $F_i \subseteq F_{i+1}$ **return** *Unreachable*.

Reachable If there is an m s.t. $\langle m, 0 \rangle \in Q$ **return** *Reachable*.

Unfold If $F_N \rightarrow \neg \text{Bad}$, then set $N \leftarrow N + 1$.

Candidate If for some m , $m \rightarrow F_N \wedge \text{Bad}$, then add $\langle m, N \rangle$ to Q .

Decide If $\langle m, i + 1 \rangle \in Q$ and there are m_0 and m_1 s.t. $m_1 \rightarrow m$, $m_0 \wedge m'_1$ is satisfiable, and $m_0 \wedge m'_1 \rightarrow F_i \wedge \text{Tr} \wedge m'$, then add $\langle m_0, i \rangle$ to Q .

Conflict For $0 \leq i < N$: given a candidate model $\langle m, i + 1 \rangle \in Q$ and clause φ , such that $\varphi \rightarrow \neg m$, if $\text{Init} \rightarrow \varphi$, and $\varphi \wedge F_i \wedge \text{Tr} \rightarrow \varphi'$, then add φ to F_j , for $j \leq i + 1$.

Leaf If $\langle m, i \rangle \in Q$, $0 < i < N$ and $F_{i-1} \wedge \text{Tr} \wedge m'$ is unsatisfiable, then add $\langle m, i + 1 \rangle$ to Q .

Induction For $0 \leq i < N$ and a clause $(\varphi \vee \psi) \in F_i$, if $\varphi \notin F_{i+1}$, $\text{Init} \rightarrow \varphi$ and $\varphi \wedge F_i \wedge \text{Tr} \rightarrow \varphi'$, then add φ to F_j , for each $j \leq i + 1$.

until ∞ ;



IC3/PDR: Solving Linear (Propositional) CHC

Unreachable and Reachable

- terminate the algorithm when a solution is found

Unfold

- increase search bound by 1

Candidate

- choose a bad state in the last frame

Decide

- extend a cex (backward) consistent with the current frame
- choose s s.t. $(s \wedge R_i \wedge Tr \wedge cex')$ is SAT

Conflict

- Find a lemma that explains why cex cannot be extended
- Find L s.t. $L \Rightarrow \neg cex$ and $L \wedge R_i \wedge Tr \Rightarrow L'$

Induction

- Propositional generalization (drop literals from the lemma)


**Theory
dependent**

$$((F_i \wedge Tr) \vee Init') \Rightarrow \varphi'$$
$$\varphi' \Rightarrow c'$$

Looking for φ'

ARITHMETIC CONFLICT

Craig Interpolation Theorem



Theorem (Craig 1957)

Let A and B be two First Order (FO) formulae such that $A \Rightarrow \neg B$, then there exists a FO formula I , denoted $ITP(A, B)$, such that


$$A \Rightarrow I \quad I \Rightarrow \neg B$$

$$atoms(I) \in atoms(A) \cap atoms(B)$$

A Craig interpolant $ITP(A, B)$ can be effectively constructed from a resolution proof of unsatisfiability of $A \wedge B$

In Model Cheching, Craig Interpolation Theorem is used to safely over-approximate the set of (finitely) reachable states

Craig Interpolant



Examples of Craig Interpolation for Theories

Boolean logic

$$A = (\neg b \wedge (\neg a \vee b \vee c) \wedge a)$$

$$B = (\neg a \vee \neg c)$$

$$ITP(A, B) = a \wedge c$$

Equality with Uninterpreted Functions (EUF)

$$A = (f(a) = b \wedge p(f(a)))$$

$$B = (b = c \wedge \neg p(c))$$

$$ITP(A, B) = p(b)$$

Linear Real Arithmetic (LRA)

$$A = (z + x + y > 10 \wedge z < 5)$$

$$B = (x < -5 \wedge y < -3)$$

$$ITP(A, B) = x + y > 5$$

Alternative Definition of an Interpolant

Let $F = A(x, z) \wedge B(z, y)$ be UNSAT, where x and y are distinct

- Note that for any assignment v to z either
 - $A(x, v)$ is UNSAT, or
 - $B(v, y)$ is UNSAT

An interpolant is a circuit $I(z)$ such that for every assignment v to z

- $I(v) = A$ only if $A(x, v)$ is UNSAT
- $I(v) = B$ only if $B(v, y)$ is UNSAT

A proof system S has a *feasible interpolation* if for every refutation π of F in S , F has an interpolant polynomial in the size of π

- propositional resolution has feasible interpolation
- extended resolution does not have feasible interpolation

Farkas Lemma

Let $M = t_1 \geq b_1 \wedge \dots \wedge t_n \geq b_n$, where t_i are linear terms and b_i are constants. M is *unsatisfiable* iff $0 \geq 1$ is derivable from M by resolution.

M is *unsatisfiable* iff $M \vdash 0 \geq 1$

- e.g., $x + y > 10, -x > 5, -y > 3 \vdash (x+y-x-y) > (10 + 5 + 3) \vdash 0 > 18$

M is unsatisfiable iff there exist *Farkas coefficients* $g_1, \dots, g_n$ such that

- $g_i \geq 0$
- $g_1 \times t_1 + \dots + g_n \times t_n = 0$
- $g_1 \times b_1 + \dots + g_n \times b_n \geq 1$

Interpolation for Linear Real Arithmetic

Let $M = A \wedge B$ be UNSAT, where


- $A = t_1 \geq b_1 \wedge \dots \wedge t_i \geq b_i$, and
- $B = t_{i+1} \geq b_{i+1} \wedge \dots \wedge t_n \geq b_n$

Let $g_1, \dots, g_n$ be the Farkas coefficients witnessing UNSAT

Then

- $g_1 \times (t_1 \geq b_1) + \dots + g_i \times (t_i \geq b_i)$ is an interpolant between A and B
- $g_{i+1} \times (t_{i+1} \geq b_{i+1}) + \dots + g_n \times (t_n \geq b_n)$ is an interpolant between B and A
- $g_1 \times t_1 + \dots + g_i \times t_i = - (g_{i+1} \times t_{i+1} + \dots + g_n \times t_n)$
- $\neg(g_{i+1} \times (t_{i+1} \geq b_{i+1}) + \dots + g_n \times (t_n \geq b_n))$ is an interpolant between A and B

Craig Interpolation for Linear Arithmetic



Useful properties of existing interpolation algorithms [CGS10] [HB12]

- $I \in \text{ITP}(A, B)$ then $\neg I \in \text{ITP}(B, A)$
- if A is syntactically convex (a monomial), then I is convex
- if B is syntactically convex, then I is co-convex (a clause)
- if A and B are syntactically convex, then I is a half-space

Arithmetic Conflict

Notation: $\mathcal{F}(A) = (A(X) \wedge Tr) \vee Init(X')$.

Conflict For $0 \leq i < N$, given a counterexample $\langle P, i+1 \rangle \in Q$ s.t.
 $\mathcal{F}(F_i) \wedge P'$ is unsatisfiable, add $P^\uparrow = \text{ITP}(\mathcal{F}(F_i), P')$ to F_j for $j \leq i+1$.

Counterexample is blocked using Craig Interpolation

- summarizes the reason why the counterexample cannot be extended

Generalization is not inductive

- weaker than IC3/PDR
- inductive generalization for arithmetic is still an open problem

$$\begin{aligned} s &\subseteq pre(c) \\ \equiv s &\Rightarrow \exists X' . Tr \wedge c' \end{aligned}$$

Computing a predecessor s of a counterexample c

ARITHMETIC DECIDE

Model Based Projection

Definition: Let φ be a formula, U a set of variables, and M a model of φ . Then $\psi = \text{MBP}(U, M, \varphi)$ is a Model Based Projection of U , M and φ iff


1. ψ is a monomial (optional)
2. $\text{Vars}(\psi) \subseteq \text{Vars}(\varphi) \setminus U$
3. $M \models \psi$
4. $\psi \Rightarrow \exists U . \varphi$

For a fixed set of variables U and a formula φ , MBP is a function from models to formulas

MBP is *finite* if its range (as a function defined above) is finite

Model Based Projection

Expensive to find a quantifier-free $\psi(\bar{y}) \equiv \exists \bar{x} \cdot \varphi(\bar{x}, \bar{y})$



1. Find model M of $\varphi(x,y)$

2. Compute a partition containing M

Loos Weispfenning Quantifier Elimination

φ is LRA formula in Negation Normal Form

E is set of $x=t$ atoms, U set of $x < t$ atoms, and L set of $s < x$ atoms

There are no other occurrences of x in $\varphi[x]$

$$\exists x. \varphi[x] \equiv \varphi[\infty] \vee \bigvee_{x=t \in E} \varphi[t] \vee \bigvee_{x < t \in U} \varphi[t - \epsilon]$$

where

$$(x < t')[t - \epsilon] \equiv t \leq t' \quad (s < x)[t - \epsilon] \equiv s < t \quad (x = e)[t - \epsilon] \equiv \text{false}$$

The case of lower bounds is dual

- using $-\infty$ and $t+\epsilon$

LW-Quantifier Elimination Example

$$\begin{aligned} & \exists x . \varphi[x] \\ \equiv & \exists x . (x = e \wedge \psi_1) \vee (s < x \wedge x < t) \vee (x < t \wedge \psi_2) \\ \equiv & \varphi[e] \vee \varphi[t - \epsilon] \vee \varphi[\infty] \\ \equiv & (\psi_1 \vee (s < e \wedge e < t) \vee (e < t \wedge \psi_2)) \vee \\ & (s < t \wedge t \leq t) \vee (t \leq t \wedge \psi_2) \vee \\ & \textit{false} \end{aligned}$$

MBP for Linear Rational Arithmetic

Compute a single disjunct from LW-QE that includes the model

- Use the Model to uniquely pick a substitution term for x

$$Mbp_x(M, x = s \wedge L) = L[x \leftarrow s]$$

$$Mbp_x(M, x \neq s \wedge L) = Mbp_x(M, s < x \wedge L) \text{ if } M(x) > M(s)$$

$$Mbp_x(M, x \neq s \wedge L) = Mbp_x(M, -s < -x \wedge L) \text{ if } M(x) < M(s)$$

$$Mbp_x(M, \bigwedge_i s_i < x \wedge \bigwedge_j x < t_j) = \bigwedge_i s_i < t_0 \wedge \bigwedge_j t_0 \leq t_j \text{ where } M(t_0) \leq M(t_i), \forall i$$

MBP techniques have been developed for

- Linear Rational Arithmetic, Linear Integer Arithmetic
- Theories of Arrays, and Recursive Data Types

Arithmetic Decide

Notation: $\mathcal{F}(A) = (A(X) \wedge Tr(X, X') \vee Init(X'))$.

Decide If $\langle P, i + 1 \rangle \in Q$ and there is a model $m(X, X')$ s.t. $m \models \mathcal{F}(F_i) \wedge P'$,
add $\langle P_{\downarrow}, i \rangle$ to Q , where $P_{\downarrow} = MBP(X', m, \mathcal{F}(F_i) \wedge P')$.

Compute a predecessor using an under-approximation of quantifier elimination – called Model Based Projection

To ensure progress, Decide must be finite


- finitely many possible predecessors when all other arguments are fixed

Alternatives

- Completeness can follow from the **Conflict** rule only
 - for Linear Arithmetic this means using Fourier-Motzkin implicants
- Completeness can follow from an interaction of **Decide** and **Conflict**

PROPERTY-DIRECTED TEST CASE GENERATION

Property-Directed Test-Case Generation



A Counterexample Harness

```
if (get_input() == 0x1234 &&
    get_input() == 0x8765) {
    __VERIFIER_error();
} else {
    return 0;
}
```

get_input() is an external function

Program considered buggy if and only if __VERIFIER_error() is reachable

```
void __get_input() {
    static int x = 0;
    switch (x++) {
        case 0: return 0x1234;
        case 1: return 0x8765;
        default: return 0; }
}
```

Implementation of external functions linked to original source code

Causes program to execute __VERIFIER_error()

Generating Harnesses for Linux Device Drivers

```
void *ldv_ptr(void)
{
    void *tmp;
    tmp = __c();
    return tmp;
}


...

void *is_got = ldv_ptr();
if (is_got <= (long)2012)
{ ... }
```

- Sample from Linux Device Verification (LDV) project¹
- Harness functions returning pointers are tricky
 - May not be reasonable addresses
 - Might return “new” memory
- Original program instrumented with memory read/store hooks that control access to external memory

¹<http://linuxtesting.org/ldv>

Virtual External Memory



Accesses to external “virtual” memory are mapped to real memory

- opportunistically allocate memory for new accesses
- ignore invalid stores, return a default value for an invalid load