

privacy and automated verification

aws albarghouthi university of wisconsin–madison



calvin smith



justin hsu



1949


1960



1970

1980

1990

2000





program
logics

abstract
interp
model
checking

industrial
tools

1949

1960



1970

1980

1990

2000





program
logics

abstract
interp
model
checking

industrial
tools

1949

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

assert($x \neq \text{null}$)

1 is my data private?

2 is the algorithm fair?

1 is my data private?

2 is the algorithm fair?

Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets


Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov
The University of Texas at Austin

Identifying Participants in the Personal Genome Project by Name


Latanya Sweeney, Akua Abu, Julia Winn

Harvard College


| | |
|---|---|
| A | 6 |
| B | 6 |
| C | 2 |




p




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


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| B | 7 |
| C | 2 |




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

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

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

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| C | 2 |



| | |
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| B | 6 |
| C | 2 |



| | |
|---|---|
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| C | 2 |



To Reduce Privacy Risks, the Census Plans to Report Less Accurate Data

Guaranteeing people's confidentiality has become more of a challenge because the new system will

Differential Privacy

There are situations where Apple can't know from what many of our users are doing and might make the most relevant suggestions. This could affect battery life? Which data which could drive the advertising on their keyboards—is personal.

Differential Privacy at Scale: Uber and Berkeley Collaboration

Tuesday, January 16, 2018 - 11:00 am-11:30 am
Joe Near, Postdoctoral Researcher, University of California, Berkeley

REQUERIDA
SU RESPUESTA ES
REQUERIDA POR LEY

A 2018 census test letter mailed to a resident in Providence, R.I. The nation's test run of the 2020 Census is in Rhode Island. Michelle R. Smith/Associated Press


By Mark Hansen

Dec. 5, 2018






google chrome
apple iOS
uber internally
census bureau
...


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


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










$$\forall d \sim d'. \mathbb{P}[p(d) = a] \leq e^\epsilon \cdot \mathbb{P}[p(d') = a]$$




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
$$p(d) - p_{exact}(d) \leq \theta \quad \text{except with prob. } \delta$$







short-term vision aid algorithm designers



short-term vision

aid algorithm designers

long-term vision

put theorists out of work

proof of report noisy max

Proof. Fix $D = D' \cup \{a\}$. Let c , respectively c' , denote the vector of counts when the database is D , respectively D' . We use two properties:

1. *Monotonicity of Counts.* For all $j \in [m]$, $c_j \geq c'_j$; and
2. *Lipschitz Property.* For all $j \in [m]$, $1 + c'_j \geq c_j$.

Fix any $i \in [m]$. We will bound from above and below the ratio of the probabilities that i is selected with D and with D' .

Fix r_{-i} , a draw from $[\text{Lap}(1/\varepsilon)]^{m-1}$ used for all the noisy counts except the i th count. We will argue for each r_{-i} independently. We

use the notation $\Pr[i|\xi]$ to mean the probability that the output of the Report Noisy Max algorithm is i , conditioned on ξ .

We first argue that $\Pr[i|D, r_{-i}] \leq e^\varepsilon \Pr[i|D', r_{-i}]$. Define

$$r^* = \min_{r_i} : c_i + r_i > c_j + r_j \quad \forall j \neq i.$$

Note that, having fixed r_{-i} , i will be the output (the argmax noisy count) when the database is D if and only if $r_i \geq r^*$.

We have, for all $1 \leq j \neq i \leq m$:

$$\begin{aligned} c_i + r^* &> c_j + r_j \\ \Rightarrow (1 + c'_i) + r^* &\geq c_i + r^* > c_j + r_j \geq c'_j + r_j \\ \Rightarrow c'_i + (r^* + 1) &> c'_j + r_j. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, if $r_i \geq r^* + 1$, then the i th count will be the maximum when the database is D' and the noise vector is (r_i, r_{-i}) . The probabilities below are over the choice of $r_i \sim \text{Lap}(1/\varepsilon)$.

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[r_i \geq 1 + r^*] &\geq e^{-\varepsilon} \Pr[r_i \geq r^*] = e^{-\varepsilon} \Pr[i|D, r_{-i}] \\ \Rightarrow \Pr[i|D', r_{-i}] &\geq \Pr[r_i \geq 1 + r^*] \geq e^{-\varepsilon} \Pr[r_i \geq r^*] = e^{-\varepsilon} \Pr[i|D, r_{-i}], \end{aligned}$$

which, after multiplying through by e^ε , yields what we wanted to show:
 $\Pr[i|D, r_{-i}] \leq e^\varepsilon \Pr[i|D', r_{-i}]$.

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Thus, if $r_i \geq r^* + 1$, then i will be the output (the argmax noisy count) on database D with randomness (r_i, r_{-i}) . We therefore have, with probabilities taken over choice of r_i :

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Thus, if $r_i \geq r^* + 1$, then i will be the output (the argmax noisy count) on database D with randomness (r_i, r_{-i}) . We therefore have, with probabilities taken over choice of r_i :

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proof of exponential mech

Proof. For clarity, we assume the range \mathcal{R} of the exponential mechanism is finite, but this is not necessary. As in all differential privacy proofs, we consider the ratio of the probability that an instantiation

of the exponential mechanism outputs some element $r \in \mathcal{R}$ on two neighboring databases $x \in \mathbb{N}^{|\mathcal{X}|}$ and $y \in \mathbb{N}^{|\mathcal{X}|}$ (i.e., $\|x - y\|_1 \leq 1$).

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\Pr[\mathcal{M}_E(x, u, \mathcal{R}) = r]}{\Pr[\mathcal{M}_E(y, u, \mathcal{R}) = r]} &= \frac{\left(\frac{\exp(\frac{\varepsilon u(x, r)}{2\Delta u})}{\sum_{r' \in \mathcal{R}} \exp(\frac{\varepsilon u(x, r')}{2\Delta u})} \right)}{\left(\frac{\exp(\frac{\varepsilon u(y, r)}{2\Delta u})}{\sum_{r' \in \mathcal{R}} \exp(\frac{\varepsilon u(y, r')}{2\Delta u})} \right)} \\ &= \left(\frac{\exp(\frac{\varepsilon u(x, r)}{2\Delta u})}{\exp(\frac{\varepsilon u(y, r)}{2\Delta u})} \right) \cdot \left(\frac{\sum_{r' \in \mathcal{R}} \exp(\frac{\varepsilon u(y, r')}{2\Delta u})}{\sum_{r' \in \mathcal{R}} \exp(\frac{\varepsilon u(x, r')}{2\Delta u})} \right) \\ &= \exp\left(\frac{\varepsilon(u(x, r) - u(y, r))}{2\Delta u}\right) \\ &\quad \cdot \left(\frac{\sum_{r' \in \mathcal{R}} \exp(\frac{\varepsilon u(y, r')}{2\Delta u})}{\sum_{r' \in \mathcal{R}} \exp(\frac{\varepsilon u(x, r')}{2\Delta u})} \right) \\ &\leq \exp\left(\frac{\varepsilon}{2}\right) \cdot \exp\left(\frac{\varepsilon}{2}\right) \cdot \left(\frac{\sum_{r' \in \mathcal{R}} \exp(\frac{\varepsilon u(x, r')}{2\Delta u})}{\sum_{r' \in \mathcal{R}} \exp(\frac{\varepsilon u(x, r')}{2\Delta u})} \right) \\ &= \exp(\varepsilon). \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, $\frac{\Pr[\mathcal{M}_E(y, u) = r]}{\Pr[\mathcal{M}_E(x, u) = r]} \geq \exp(-\varepsilon)$ by symmetry. \square

logics

barthe et al. 2018
chadha et al. 2007
den harton 2002
rand and zdancewic 2015
...
...

pre-expectation calculus

kozen 1985
morgan et al. 1996
...
...

martingales

chakarov and sankaranarayyan 2013
chatterjee et al. 2016{a, b}, 2017
mclver et al. 2018
...
...

probabilistic model checking

survey by katoen 2016
hermanns et al. 2008
kattenbelt et al. 2009, 2010
tiege and fränzle 2011
...
...

...and more!

logics
not automated

pre-expectation calculus

kozen 1985
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**logics
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require additional manual
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**pre-expectation calculus
complex integrals**

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...

...and more!

logics
not automated

martingales
require additional manual reasoning

pre-expectation calculus
complex integrals

probabilistic model checking
(mostly) finite state and no symbolic distributions

...and more!

1 automatic proofs of accuracy [POPL19]

- 1** automatic proofs of accuracy [POPL19]
- 2** automatic proofs of differential privacy [POPL18]

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synthesis of privacy-preserving algorithms [ICFP 19]

theme get rid of probability! long live logic!

```
def rnm(q):
    i, best, r = 0
    while i < |q|
        d ~ Lap(q[i], 2/ε)

        if d > best || i = 0
            r = i
            best = d

        i = i + 1
    return r
```


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
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
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
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
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


$$x > 0 \quad \text{---} \quad y = x + 1 \quad \text{---} \quad y > 0$$


```
graph LR; A(( )) -- "y = x + 1" --> B(( ));
```








$$x > 0 \quad \text{---} \quad y = x + 1 \quad \text{---} \quad y > 0$$





$$x > 0 \quad \wedge \quad y = x + 1 \quad \Rightarrow \quad y > 0$$








$$x > 0 \quad \wedge \quad y = x + 1 \quad \Rightarrow \quad y > 0$$

solve with a **SAT/SMT** solver









⋮




p


$1-p$


T F



$p \in (0, 1)$








challenge how do we check this with first-order logic?

$$p \in (0, 1)$$



$x \sim \text{flip}(p)$




$x = T$

except with prob.
 $\leq 1-p$

$$p \in (0, 1)$$

$x \sim \text{flip}(p)$



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



$$p \in (0, 1)$$


\wedge

$$w = \emptyset$$





$$p \in (0, 1)$$



except with prob.
 $\leq 1-p$



$$p \in (0, 1) \\ \wedge$$

$$w = 0$$


$\xrightarrow{\text{assume}(x=T)}$



$$p \in (0, 1)$$

\wedge

$$w = 0$$





challenge many different axiomatizations

$$p \in (0, 1)$$

\wedge

$$w = 0$$






challenge many different axiomatizations

$$p \in (0, 1)$$


\wedge

$$w = 0$$




challenge many different axiomatizations

$x \sim dist$



challenge many different axiomatizations


$x \sim dist$



assume x is one of
those 3 values

challenge many different axiomatizations

$x \sim dist$




assume x is one of
those 3 values

failure probability is

challenge many different axiomatizations

$x \sim dist$




assume x is one of
those 3 values

failure probability is

challenge many different axiomatizations

$$p \in (0, 1)$$




except with prob.
 $\leq 1-p$



$$p \in (0, 1)$$

\wedge



$$w = 0$$







$x = T$

\wedge


$$w \leq 1-p$$







$p \in (0, 1)$



except with prob.
 $\leq 1-p$

$p \in (0, 1)$

\wedge

$w = 0$

assume($R(x)$)



$w = w +$
 $\Pr(\neg R(x))$

$x = T$

\wedge


$w \leq 1-p$

$\exists R . \forall w, w', x .$




$\exists R . \forall w, w', x .$


$$w = 0 \wedge R(x) \wedge w' = w + \Pr(\neg R(x)) \implies x \wedge w' \leq 1 - p$$




except with prob. p_1



except with prob. p_2




except with prob. p_3




simply, total failure probability is $\sum_i p_i$

$$y \sim \text{Lap}(x, s)$$




$$y \sim \text{Lap}(x, s)$$



axiom family

$$|x - y| \leq s \cdot \log\left(\frac{1}{f(V_I)}\right)$$


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axiom family

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
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$$|x - y| \leq s \cdot \log \left(\frac{1}{\boxed{f(V_I)}} \right)$$

with failure probability

$$f(V_I) \in (0, 1]$$

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axiom family

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with failure probability

$$f(V_I) \in (0, 1]$$

```
def rnm(q):
    i, best, r = 0
    while i < |q|
        d ~ Lap(q[i], 2/ε)

        if d > best || i = 0
            r = i
            best = d

        i = i + 1
    return r
```

$$p \in (0, 1)$$

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$$\forall j. q[r] \geq q[j] - 4/\epsilon * \log(|q|/p)$$

except with prob. $\leq p$

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    return r

```



$$|q[i] - d| \leq \frac{2}{\epsilon} \cdot \log\left(\frac{|q|}{p}\right)$$

with failure probability $\frac{p}{|q|}$


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
- 1 automatic proofs of accuracy [POPL19]
- 2 automatic proofs of differential privacy [POPL18]

theme get rid of probability! long live logic!


| | |
|---|---|
| A | 6 |
| B | 1 |
| C | 0 |





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

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

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| | |
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$$\forall d \sim d', a, \epsilon\;.$$

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$$\mathbb{P}[p(d) = a] \leq e^\epsilon \cdot \mathbb{P}[p(d') = a]$$

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problems

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proving differential privacy is hard and error-prone [lyu et al. 16]

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existing automated techniques only work for simple algorithms

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proving differential privacy is hard and error-prone [lyu et al. 16]
existing automated techniques only work for simple algorithms

goal

automatically prove differential privacy of advanced algorithms

key ideas

key ideas

view differential privacy **coupling proofs as games**

key ideas


view differential privacy **coupling proofs as games**

solve a program **synthesis/verification problem**

$$\exists q . \forall x . \varphi(q, x)$$


variable approximate couplings

scale of distributions is **$1/y$**



variable approximate couplings

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


$$\{(c, c, y) \mid c \in \mathbb{Z}\}$$

variable approximate couplings


scale of distributions is **$1/y$**

$$\mu_1(c) \leq e^y \cdot \mu_2(c)$$




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
scale of distributions is **$1/y$**



$$\{(c, c, 2y) \mid c \in \mathbb{Z}\}$$


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variable approximate couplings

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$$\{(c, c+1, 0) \mid c \in \mathbb{Z}\}$$

proof rule

p is DP if $\forall d \sim d', \epsilon . \exists \mathcal{C}.$

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
\mathcal{C} couples $p(d), p(d')$

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\mathcal{C} couples $p(d), p(d')$



$\mathcal{C} = \{(c, c, y) \mid y \leq \epsilon\}$






$$|x_1 - x_2| = 1$$





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









the triple **(y1, y2, w)** is a coupling!



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let's play!

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def rnm(q):
    i, best, r = 0

    while i < |q|
        d ~ Lap(q[i], 2/ε)

        if d > best || i = 0
            r = i
            best = d

        i = i + 1

    return r
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q1 = [9, 0]

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    q1 = [9, 0]           q2 = [10, 1]  
    w = 0
```

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[dwork & roth 14]

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r1 = r2 \wedge w $\leq \epsilon$

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[dwork & roth 14]

| | |
|----------------|-----------------|
| $q_1 = [9, 0]$ | $q_2 = [10, 1]$ |
| $w = 0$ | |
| $r_1 = 0$ | $r_2 = 0$ |

| |
|------------------------------------|
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|------------------------------------|

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
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[dwork & roth 14]

q1 = [9, 0]

w = 0

r2 = 0


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[dwork & roth 14]

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
non-deterministically pick from

$$\{(c, c, \epsilon/2) \mid c \in \mathbb{Z}\}$$

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[dwork & roth 14]

q1 = [9, 0]

q2 = [10, 1]

w = 0

r1 = 0

r2 = 0

r1 = 0

r2 = 0

d1 = c

d2 = c


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while i < |q|
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[dwork & roth 14]

$q_1 = [9, 0]$

$q_2 = [10, 1]$

$w = 0$

$r_1 = 0$

$r_2 = 0$

$r_1 = 0$

$r_2 = 0$

$d_1 = c$

$d_2 = c$

$w = \epsilon/2$

non-deterministically pick from

$\{(c, c, \epsilon/2) \mid c \in \mathbb{Z}\}$

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        i = i + 1

    return r

```

[dwork & roth 14]

| | | |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|
| $q_1 = [9, 0]$ | $w = \theta$ | $q_2 = [10, 1]$ |
| $r_1 = 0$ | | $r_2 = 0$ |
| $r_1 = 0$ | | $r_2 = 0$ |
| $d_1 = c$ | | $d_2 = c$ |
| | $w = \varepsilon/2$ | |
| $r_1 = r_2 \wedge w \leq \varepsilon$ | | |

```

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[dwork & roth 14]

| | | |
|--|---|-----------------|
| $q_1 = [9, 0]$ $r_1 = 0$ $r_1 = 0$ $d_1 = c$ \vdots $w = \varepsilon$ | $w = 0$ $r_2 = 0$ $r_2 = 0$ $d_2 = c$ \vdots $r_1 = r_2 \wedge w \leq \varepsilon$ | $q_2 = [10, 1]$ |
|--|---|-----------------|

our game strategy

in every iteration, couple samples using

$$\{(c, c, \epsilon/2) \mid c \in \mathbb{Z}\}$$

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~~our game strategy~~

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a winning strategy

use this coupling in 1 iteration only


$$\{(c, c + 1, \epsilon) \mid c \in \mathbb{Z}\}$$

a winning strategy

use this coupling in 1 iteration only

$$\{(c, c + 1, \epsilon) \mid c \in \mathbb{Z}\}$$

in all other iterations pay **zero cost**



winning strategies are programs

if condition

use coupling C1

else

use coupling C2


evaluation

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| PARTIALSUM | Compute the noisy sum of a list of queries. |
| PREFIXSUM | Compute the noisy sum for every prefix of a list of queries. |
| SMARTSUM | Advanced version of PREFIXSUM that chunks the list [Chan et al. 2011; Dwork et al. 2010]. |
| REPORTNOISYMAX | Find the element with the highest quality score [Dwork and Roth 2014]. |
| EXPMECH | Variant of REPORTNOISYMAX using the exponential distribution [Dwork and Roth 2014; McSherry and Talwar 2007]. |
| ABOVETHRESHOLD | Find the index of the first query above threshold [Dwork and Roth 2014]. |
| ABOVETHRESHOLDN | Find the indices of the first N queries with answer above threshold [Dwork and Roth 2014; Lyu et al. 2017]. |
| NUMERICSPARSE | Return the index and answer of the first query above threshold [Dwork and Roth 2014]. |
| NUMERICSPARSEN | Return the indices and answers of the first N queries above threshold [Dwork and Roth 2014; Lyu et al. 2017]. |

...and more!

- 1 automatic proofs of accuracy [POPL19]
- 2 automatic proofs of differential privacy [POPL18]

theme get rid of probability! long live logic!





```

function IDC
  (iter : Nat[i]) (eps : num[e])
  (db : [2 * i * e] db_type) (qs : query bag)
  (PA : (query bag) -> approx_db
   -> db_type -o[e] Circle query)
  (DUA : approx_db -> query -> num -> approx_db)
  (eval_q : query -> db_type -o[1] num)
  : Circle approx_db {
  case iter of
    0      => return init_approx
  | n + 1 =>
    sample approx = (IDC n eps db qs PA DUA);
    sample q = PA qs approx db;
    sample actual = add_noise eps (eval_q q db);
    return (DUA approx q actual)
}

```

Figure 11. Iterative Database Function in *DFuzz*

[Gupta, Roth, Ullman, TCC 2012]

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