


Provably Robust Adversarial Examples

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Single adversarial attacks vs Robust adversarial regions

Problem setting

- Traditionally, robustness of x_{orig} is assessed by generating **individual attacks** x_1 and x_2 within a ball around it (in red).
- Description of the **whole adversarial region** (in green) is preferable. The region can contain **trillions** of adversarial images.



Single adversarial attacks vs Adversarial regions

Single attacks:

- Easy to generate
- Less informative

Adversarial regions:

- More Informative
- Efficiently summarizes many individual attack
- Computationally expensive

Key idea: Use single attacks to generate initial region and **refine** it until provably verifiable.


Algorithm overview

I. Use **PGD** to generate many individual attacks. Fit a **hyperbox** around them to restrain search region. The region is shown in blue.

II. Use the overapproximation box to initialize. At each step use **black box verification tool** based on convex-relaxations to generate a **half-space constraint** which if added to the current box makes the resulting region **verifiably adversarial**. Adjust the constraints' **bias** such that a part of the box is removed but the constraint is **weaker**. Create **maximal box not intersecting** the adjusted constraint. Repeat until **verification succeeds**. Results in **hyperbox robust example**. The region is shown in purple.

III. Initialize with the overapproximation box. At each step use **black box verification tool** to generate half-space constraints that force the ReLU neurons to become **decided** and for the verification objective to become **positive**. **Bias-adjust** them so they **do not intersect** the underapproximation box. This **enforces** the polyhedral region to be **larger** than the hyperbox example. Repeat until **verification**. Results in **polyhedral robust example**. The region is shown in red.

PARADE: Provably Robust Adversarial Examples



Robust adversarial examples to l_∞ -attacks

NETWORK	ϵ	#COR	#IMG	#REG	#VER	BASELINE			PARADE BOX			PARADE POLY		
						TIME	SIZE	#VER	TIME	SIZE	#VER	TIME	SIZE	
MNIST 8x200	0.045	97	22	53	41	272 s	10^{24}	53	114 s	10^{121}	53	1556 s	$< 10^{191}$	
MNIST CONV SML	0.12	100	21	32	31	171 s	10^{339}	32	74 s	10^{494}	32	141 s	$< 10^{561}$	
MNIST CONV BIG	0.05	98	18	29	15	1933 s	10^9	28	880 s	10^{137}	28	5636 s	$< 10^{173}$	
CIFAR10 CONV SML	0.006	59	23	44	28	238 s	10^{360}	44	113 s	10^{486}	44	264 s	$< 10^{543}$	
CIFAR10 CONV BIG	0.008	60	25	36	26	479 s	10^{380}	36	404 s	10^{573}	36	610 s	$< 10^{654}$	

- PARADE** regions contain up to 10^{573} individual adversarial images.
- PARADE** produces adversarial regions for all but one adversarial image.
- Regions generated by **PARADE** are much larger than uniform shrinking baseline.
- PARADE** hyperbox example generation is **2x** faster than the uniform shrinking baseline.

Experimental evaluation

Robust adversarial examples to geometric perturbations

NETWORK	TRANSFORM	#COR	#IMG	#REG	#VER	TIME	#SPLITS	BASELINE		PARADE		
								UNDER	OVER	UNDER	OVER	
MNIST CONV SML	R(17) Sc(18) Sh(0.03)	99	38	54	10	890 s	2x5x2	51	774 s	$1x2x1$	$> 10^{96}$	$< 10^{195}$
	Sc(20) T(-1.7,1.7,-1.7,1.7)	99	32	56	5	682 s	4x3x3	51	521 s	$2x1x1$	$> 10^{71}$	$< 10^{160}$
	Sc(20) R(13) B(10, 0.05)	99	33	48	2	420 s	3x2x2x2	40	370 s	$2x1x1x1$	$> 10^{70}$	$< 10^{455}$
MNIST CONV BIG	R(10) Sc(15) Sh(0.03)	95	40	50	9	812 s	2x4x2	44	835 s	$1x2x1$	$> 10^{77}$	$< 10^{205}$
	Sc(20) T(0,1,0,1)	95	34	46	2	435 s	4x2x2	42	441 s	$2x1x1$	$> 10^{64}$	$< 10^{174}$
	Sc(15) R(9) B(5, 0.05)	95	39	52	2	801 s	3x2x2x2	46	537 s	$2x1x1x1$	$> 10^{119}$	$< 10^{545}$
CIFAR CONV SML	R(2.5) Sc(10) Sh(0.02)	53	24	29	1	1829 s	5x2x2	29	1369 s	$2x1x1$	$> 10^{599}$	$< 10^{1173}$
	Sc(10) T(0,1,0,1)	53	28	32	1	1489 s	4x3x3	32	954 s	$2x1x1$	$> 10^{66}$	$< 10^{174}$
	Sc(5) R(8) B(1, 0.01)	53	21	25	1	2189 s	5x2x2x2	21	1481 s	$2x1x1x1$	$> 10^{213}$	$< 10^{2187}$

- PARADE** can handle diverse combinations of geometric perturbations, as it relies on DeepG in a **black-box** way.
- In similar time, **PARADE** generates **more verifiable regions** containing **more images** compared to baseline based on splitting.

Robust adversarial examples and Randomized Smoothing

METHOD	MNIST			CIFAR	
	8x200	CONV SML	CONV BIG	CONV SML	CONV BIG
BASELINE	0.55	0.38	0.59	0.53	0.26
PARADE	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
IND ATT MEAN	0.29	0.16	0.18	0.48	0.25
IND ATT 95% PERC	0.53	0.44	0.51	0.61	0.37

- PARADE** produces regions that are more robust (have **bigger robust radius** verified using **smoothing**) compared to uniform shrinking and individual attacks used during **Step I** of the algorithm.

Empirically vs Provably robust adversarial examples

- Empirical examples can exhibit high Expectation-Over-Transformation (EoT), while their **subregions** close to the original attacked point **incur very low EoT scores**.
- Empirically robust adversarial example techniques recovered less regions: **44 vs 24**.

Visualisation of Robust Adversarial Examples

