Scalable Taint Specification Inference with Big Code

Victor Chibotaru
DeepCode

Benjamin Bichsel
ETH Zurich

Veselin Raychev
DeepCode

Martin Vechev
ETH Zurich

OWASP top 10 security threats to web apps

1. Injection (SQL, NoSQL, OS command, Code, …)
2. Broken Authentication
3. Sensitive Data Exposure
4. XML External Entities (XXE)
5. Broken Access Control
6. Security Misconfiguration
7. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
8. Insecure Deserialization
9. Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
10. Insufficient Logging & Monitoring

Injection vulnerabilities

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A typical injection vulnerability

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A typical injection vulnerability

```
def upload():
  fname = flask.request.files['f'].filename
  path = os.path.join(upload_dir, fname)
  flask.request.files['f'].save(path)
```

A typical injection exploit

```
def upload():
  fname = "../../../etc/passwd"
  path = "/var/www/app/../../../etc/passwd"
  flask.request.files['f'].save("/etc/passwd")
```

Taint Analysis: detecting injection vulnerabilities

```
def upload():
  fname = flask.request.files['f'].filename
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```



Taint Analysis: sources

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

Taint Analysis: sinks

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

Taint Analysis: vulnerability model

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

A typical fix

```
def upload():
  fname = flask.request.files['f'].filename
  fname = werkzeug.secure_filename(fname)
  path = os.path.join(upload_dir, fname)
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Taint Analysis: sanitizers

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

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

Completeness of taint specifications is crucial

Missing source or sink → undetected vulnerabilities

Missing sanitizer → false positive reports

Creating taint specifications is labour-intensive



Flask

django

spring

Creating taint specifications is labour-intensive

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Goal: Automatically learn Taint Specifications from Big Code

Learning Taint Specifications from Big Code



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

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

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

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

System requirements

- The system has to be **fast** enough to learn from Big Code

- The system has to work with **few** known specifications

Merlin (Livshits et al., PLDI ‘09)

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Semi--supervised learning

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Inference based on **factor graphs**

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SuSi (Rasthofer et al., NDSS Symposium 2014)

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SVM

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Supervised learning

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Seldon

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Inference based on **linear constraints**

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Solution: Seldon

Static Code Analysis

- ➢ Static analysis is used to build data flow graphs for training programs
- ➢ Nodes are events in program (e.g. function calls, parameter loads)
- ➢ Edges represent the data flow between events
- ➢ Flow, Context, Field-sensitive points-to analysis
- ➢ Over-approximates usages of Python data structures



Beliefs about taint flow



Beliefs about taint flow

“Sanitizers secure sinks from untrusted input”

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

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

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

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Beliefs about taint flow

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

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

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

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

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

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Beliefs about taint flow

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

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

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

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

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

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

Seldon overview



Candidate scores



$0 \leq SRC_A, SAN_A, SNK_A \leq 1$

Instantiations of beliefs

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

Instantiations of beliefs

If

B is a sanitizer

And

C is a sink

Then

At least one of X, Y, Z is a source



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

$$SRC_X + SRC_Y + SRC_Z + 1 \geq SAN_B + SNK_C$$

Instantiations of beliefs



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

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

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

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

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

$SNK_X + SNK_Y + SNK_Z + 1 \geq SRC_A + SAN_B$

Instantiations of beliefs



Hard constraints for known specifications



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

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

Hard constraints for known specifications



Seldon overview



Seldon in production at deepcode.ai

Seldon for Python (this work)



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

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

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

Seldon for Python (this work)



Seldon’s scalability



Impact of learning from Big Code

Evaluated on three randomly chosen projects separately (Patchwork, find_link, Django FileBrowser)

	Total number of true candidates inferred	Precision of inferred candidates
Individual model for each project	5	45.5%
Model trained on Big Code	23	65.7%

Predicted Vulnerabilities with Taint Analysis

	Predicted vulnerabilities	Estimated true vulnerabilities
Seed Specifications	662	159 (24%)
Inferred Specifications	21318	5969 (28%)

Breakdown of reports





Vulnerabilities in real projects detected using Seldon Specs

1. https://github.com/anyaudio/anyaudio-server/pull/163
2. https://github.com/DataViva/dataviva-site/issues/1661
3. https://github.com/DataViva/dataviva-site/issues/1662
4. https://github.com/earthgecko/skyline/issues/85
5. https://github.com/earthgecko/skyline/issues/86
6. https://github.com/gestorpsi/gestorpsi/pull/75
7. https://github.com/HarshShah1997/Shopping-Cart/pull/2
8. https://github.com/kylewm/silo.pub/issues/57
9. https://github.com/kylewm/woodwind/issues/77
10. https://github.com/LMFDB/lmfdb/pull/2695
11. https://github.com/LMFDB/lmfdb/pull/2696
12. https://github.com/mgymrek/pybamview/issues/52
13. https://github.com/MinnPost/election-night-api/issues/1
14. https://github.com/mitre/multiscanner/issues/159
15. https://github.com/MLTSHP/mltshp/pull/509
16. https://github.com/mozilla/pontoon/pull/1175
17. https://github.com/PadamSethia/shorty/pull/4
18. https://github.com/sharadbhat/VideoHub/issues/3
19. https://github.com/UDST/urbansim/issues/213
20. https://github.com/viaict/viaduct/pull/5
21. https://github.com/yashbidasaria/Harry-s-List-Friends/issues/1

- **17** projects, **49** severe vulnerabilities (Cross-Site Scripting, SQL Injection, Path Traversal, OS Command Injection, Code Injection)
- Only **3** vulnerabilities could be detected using the seed specifications

Summary





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