

Automated Formal Verification of Smart Contracts





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Growth of the Ethereum Ecosystem



Emerging businesses are built on top of Ethereum smart contracts

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Smart Contract *Security Bugs* in the News



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| CYBERSECURITY TECH MOBILE SOCIAL MEDIA E | |
| \$32 million wor currency ether hackers | rth of digital stolen by |
| wednesday. | llet was exploited by hackers. ay where \$7 million worth of ether |
| | l ET Thu, 20 July 2017 |
| | n worth of ethereum |

er hacker attack

arity's wallet software

e been



www.iamesedition.com

ntract coding company Parity yesterday issued a security alert, warning of a vulnerability in version 1.5 or later of its wallet software. According to the company, so far 150,000 ethers have been stolen, worth nearly \$35 million at current price levels. The amount of the stolen ether has been confirmed by Etherscan.io.

Photo: Finance Magnates

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What are Ethereum Smart Contracts?



- Small programs that *handle money* (ether)
- Executed on the Ethereum blockchain
- Written in high-level languages (e.g., Solidity)
- No patching after release

What can go wrong when programs handle billions of USD?



Security Bug #1: Reentrancy



An attacker used this bug to steal 3.6M ether (equivalent of *\$1B today*)

Security Bug #2: Unprivileged write to storage



An attacker used a similar bug to *steal \$32M* few weeks ago

More Security Bugs...



Unexpected ether flows



Insecure coding, such as unprivileged writes (e.g., Multisig Parity bug)



Use of unsafe inputs (e.g., reflection, hashing, ...)



Reentrant method calls (e.g., DAO bug)



Transaction reordering



Automated Security Analysis



Automated Security Analysis: Existing Solutions



Problem: Cannot enumerate all possible contract behaviors...

Automated Security Analysis: Existing Solutions



- Testing
 - Very limited guarantees



- Dynamic analysis
- Symbolic execution

Better than testing, but can still miss vulnerabilities

- Static analysis
- Formal verification

Strong guarantees

Automated Security Analysis: Existing Solutions





The first fully *automated*, one-click, *formal verification system* for Ethereum smart contracts

Provides *trust* towards both contract users and developers





www.securify.ch

Released last month, so far:



95% positive feedback



>1K uploaded smart contracts

>150 users signed up for updates



[-] mcgravier 22 points 12 days ago

Seems almost too good to be true :) What are the limitations and how exactly does it work under the hood?

It's great that the authors of the tool are aware they are ap set of behaviors in the growing direction. That's the way to safety properties without false-negatives. I'm interested how they compare their EVM semantics against other EVM implementations in the wild.

[-] AlexanderSupersloth 12 points 12 days ago

Please, someone, humour a layman: how can a Turing complete language be formally verified?

I thought formally verifiable languages were necessarily not Turing complete, and we can therefore not formally verify Solidity.

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