ETH
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SPaCIoS

SECFUZZ: Fuzz-testing Security Protocols

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Motivation


Input universe
Well-formed
inputs
Invalid inputs
Security protocol
implementation
Abnormal behaviors
Behaviors
May expose
vulnerabilities

Fuzz-testing Security Protocols

Step 1

Collect well-formed inputs
- Internet
- Source code *(white-box)*
- Model *(model-based)*

Step 2

Mutate the inputs
- Fuzz operators

Step 3

Execute the inputs and check for failures
- E.g. memory errors, broken invariants

Challenges



Challenges:

- *Encrypted messages*
- *Security protocols are stateful*
- *Messages are non-replayable*

SecFuzz: Setting



Key advantages:

- *Light-weight and modular approach*
- *Fresh messages*
- *Fuzzer can decrypt messages*

Input Mutation

A fuzz operator:

- Mutates a well-formed input.
- The mutated input is *likely* to expose vulnerabilities.

The fuzz operators should produce mutated inputs that expose common programming mistakes.

Input Structure

An input i consists of:

- a sequence of messages

$$i = m_1 \cdot m_2 \cdots m_n$$

- a message consists of fields

$$m_k = f_1 \cdot f_2 \cdots f_k$$



Fuzz operators

- Message fuzz operators
  - Insert random (well-formed) message



- Field fuzz operator
  - Insert random field
  - Remove field
  - Duplicate field
  - Modify field



Fuzz-testing Security Protocols

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Detecting vulnerabilities



- The dynamic analysis monitors the SUT and reports failures.
- Memory errors are a common source of vulnerabilities:
  - Tools: Valgrind's Memcheck, IBM's Purify

Internet Key Exchange Case Study

Experiment 1

Test subject: OpenSwan v2.6.35

Results: Discovered a previously unknown use-after-free vulnerability.

Experiment 2

Test subject: ShrewSoft's VPN Client for Windows v2.1.7

Results: Discovered a previously unknown unhandled exception vulnerability.

Fuzz-testing OpenSwan



- SUT: **OpenSwan** v2.6.35
  - A popular IPSec implementation for Linux.
- Dynamic analysis: **Valgrind's Memcheck**
  - Detects different types of memory access errors.
- Fuzzer: **SecFuzz**, implemented using Python / Scapy.

OpenSwan: IKE Implementation details



OpenSwan: Use-after-free Vulnerability



The vulnerability was reported and a security patch was released in CVE-2011-4073.

ShrewSoft's VPN Client: Unhandled Exception



The vulnerability details will appear in CVE-2012-0784.

Related Approaches

Key Requirements:

- *Stateful exploration*
- *Encryption handling*

Approach / Task	**Model-based**	**White-box**	**SecFuzz**
Generate inputs	Needs a model	Needs the source code	Needs a running implementation
Execute inputs	Concretization	Solve crypto constraints	Immediate

Challenges



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

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Fuzz Operators

Fuzzing fields

1. Insert random field 
2. Remove field 
3. Duplicate field 
4. Modify field 

Hypothesis 2: Programmers often fail to properly validate inputs.

Use-after-free Vulnerability



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