

Composite Decentralized Access Control

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Example: SweGrid

Goal

Provides computational and storage resources to researchers




Access Control Requirements

- A project leader **delegates** his authority over resources to principals
- A project leader **composes** the principals' policies (e.g., using permit-override)



Delegation

Multiple principals can **issue** **access rights**



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



Decentralized Access Control

Composition

Policy decisions in large-scale systems

- Grant, Deny, **Not-applicable**, **Conflict**





Composition operators, e.g.:

- Permit-override
- Deny-override
- Conflict-override

Composition

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


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
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Composite Access Control


System Model



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Related Work

Systems and standards	
Formal foundations	

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	Delegation
Systems and standards	SecPAL for Grid KeyNote PDP (RFC 2704)
Formal foundations	RT ('01) DKAL ('08) ...

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	Delegation	Composition
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Related Work

	Delegation	Composition	Delegation + Composition
Systems and standards	SecPAL for Grid KeyNote PDP (RFC 2704)	XACML v2.0	SweGrid XACML v3.0 ('13) WSO2 ID Server
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How to Build Access Control Systems



Specify Policy

- Formal semantics
- Support for delegation
- Support for composition



Verify Policy

- Analysis language
- Decision algorithms



Construct PDP

- Efficient evaluation algorithm

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


Construct PDP

- Efficient evaluation algorithm

Belnap Logic + Datalog = BelLog

Belnap Logic




(stratified) Datalog

(Program) $P ::= \vec{r}$
(rule) $r ::= a \leftarrow \vec{l}$
(literal) $l ::= a \mid \neg a$
(atom) a

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


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


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
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$\neg$ Negation on truth
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Semantics

Extend stratified Datalog to four-valued fixed-point semantics

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BelLog Examples

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Agreement $polA(Req) \leftarrow polB(Req) \oplus polC(Req)$

Conflict-override $polA(Req) \leftarrow polB(Req)[\top \mapsto polC(Req)]$

BelLog Examples

Transitive delegation

$req)@Y, delegate(Y)@X$

Policy targets

$Req) \blacktriangleright polB(Req)$

Agreement

$eq) \oplus polC(Req)$

Conflict-override

$eq)[\top \mapsto polC(Req)]$

Other idioms?

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


Policy Analysis

Does the policy meet its requirements?



Policy




Requirements



Policy Analysis


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
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
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
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Policy Analysis

Does the policy meet its requirements?





Analysis Questions

Syntax

(question) $(c \Rightarrow P_1 \preceq P_2)$

(condition) $c ::= a(X) = \mathbf{t} \mid \exists X. c \mid \neg c \mid \dots$

- Is policy **P2** more permissive than **P1** for all inputs that satisfy the condition **c**?



Analysis Questions


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For a given input:



 Requests granted by **P1**

 Requests granted by **P2**



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
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
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For a given input:



Check for all inputs that satisfy the condition

-  Requests granted by **P1**
-  Requests granted by **P2**

Example: Analysis Question


Policy

P

Requirement

If the requester is a project leader, then grant access.

Example: Analysis Question





Analysis



Analysis

Theorem 1

Policy containment is **undecidable**



Analysis

Theorem 1

Policy containment is **undecidable**

Theorem 2

Policy containment for **unary-input policies*** is in **CO-NEXP-COMPLETE**

*Unary-input policies

- Example: $pol(Sub, Obj) \leftarrow leader(Sub), pub(Obj)$



Analysis

Theorem 1

Policy containment is **undecidable**

Theorem 2

Policy containment for **unary-input policies*** is in **CO-NEXP-COMPLETE**

Theorem 3

Policy containment for **a finite universe** is in **CO-NP-COMPLETE**

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Constructing PDPs




Theorem 4

Policy entailment is in **PTIME**

Policy Interpreter

<http://bellog.org>



GitHub

<https://github.com/ptsankov/bellog/>

Limitations



- Analysis of administrative changes
- Analysis complexity and tool support
- Usability


BelLog Contributions



A foundation for
composite decentralized
access control



Policy analysis
framework



BelLog PDP
(www.bellog.org)