#### **Reliable and Interpretable Artificial Intelligence**

Lecture 8: Certified Defenses

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
## Can certification methods benefit training?

Verifying networks which are not meant to be robust will certainly produce worse results (smaller epsilon provability) than verifying networks which are trained to be provably robust.

Note that there is a difference between training the network to be experimentally robust (e.g., PGD defense) vs. training the network to be provably robust (what we see next).

So, can we then use certification for training the network to be robust?

# Recall: PGD Defense




- *D* is the underlying distribution
- **E** is typically estimated with the empirical risk
- S(x) denotes the perturbation region around point x, that is, we want all points in S(x) to classify the same as x. We can pick S(x) to be:

$$S(x) = \{ x' \mid \|x - x'\|_{\infty} < \epsilon \}$$


Madry et.al, 2017

# Lets Incorporate Provability



abstraction

## Visualization of Certified Training



Essentially: automatic differentiation of abstract interpretation

### **Adversarial Training**


find  $\theta$ minimize  $\rho(\theta)$ 

where

 $\rho(\theta) = \mathbf{E}_{(x,y)\sim D} [\max_{\mathbf{x}' \in S(\mathbf{x})} L(\theta, \mathbf{x}', y)]$ 

Find input x' that achieves high loss

### **Certified Defense**




Find output *z* that achieves high loss (under abstraction)

## **Certified Defenses: General Method**

$$\max_{z \in \gamma(NN^{\#}(S(x)))} L(\theta, z, y)$$


Let us examine the pattern in the concrete first.

The pattern works with any abstract relaxation.




Differentiable Abstract Interpretation for Provably Robust Neural Networks Mirman, Gehr, V. ICML 2018

#### Let us now pick a loss function L




## Certified Defenses with a given loss




perturbations, e.g.,  $L_{\infty}$  ball

Differentiable Abstract Interpretation for Provably Robust Neural Networks Mirman, Gehr, V. ICML 2018

## Certified Defenses with a given loss



## Certified Defenses in the abstract



# Defining $max(box(d_0))$

$$d_0 = 3 + \epsilon_1 - 2\epsilon_2$$

 $\epsilon_1$  and  $\epsilon_2$  range over [-1,1]

 $d_{-1,-1} = 3 - 1 + 2 = 4$ 

$$d_{-1,1} = 3 - 1 - 2 = 0$$

$$d_{1,-1} = 3 + 1 + 2 = 6$$

$$d_{1,1} = 3 + 1 - 2 = 2$$

 $d_{box} = \begin{bmatrix} 0, 6 \end{bmatrix} \quad \max(d_{box}) = 6$ 

plug in -1 for both

plug in -1 for  $\epsilon_1$ , and 1 for  $\epsilon_2$ 

plug in 1 for  $\epsilon_1$ , and -1 for  $\epsilon_2$ 

plug in 1 for both

Of course, to compute max, rather than enumerating combinations, we pick the value for the  $\epsilon$  depending on its sign in  $d_0$ . If positive, pick 1, if negative, pick -1.

# Let us keep the same pattern but now pick a different loss, the cross-entropy loss CE


 $L(\mathbf{z}, \mathbf{y}) = CE(\mathbf{z}, \mathbf{y})$ 

This is in the concrete, but we need to work in the abstract.

On the Effectiveness of Interval Bound Propagation for Training Verifiably Robust Models, 2018 Gowal, Dvijotham, Stanforth, Bunel, Qin, Uesato, Arandjelovic, Mann, Kohli

# Let us keep the same pattern but now pick a different loss, the cross-entropy loss CE

 $L(\mathbf{z}, y) = CE(\mathbf{z}, y)$ 



#### Few additional tricks in practice

- Annealing on the size of S(x) start with small region around x (small  $\epsilon$ ) and gradually grow it during training. This was found to be most helpful heuristic.
- Even though the whole propagation is done via Box, IBP processes the last linear layer exactly (e.g., zonotope).
- Dynamically weighing-in the standard CE loss and the correctness CE loss.

These and more implemented in the DiffAI certified training system: <u>https://github.com/eth-sri/diffai</u>

#### Key observations when using DiffAI scheme in practice:

Using cheap relaxations (e.g., Box) scales to large networks. But the problem is, it introduces a lot of garbage (infeasible points) in the final output shape, meaning the deeper the network is, the more the capacity increases (potential for higher accuracy), but the more we are training w.r.t. assigning labels to garbage points. Thus, typically training with Box scales but accuracy drops substantially.

Naturally we would like to reduce the infeasible points w.r.t to which we are training. However, it turned out that more precise relaxations (e.g., Zonotope) may lead to worse results than Box! This is an unintuitive pathological situation where more precise relaxations during training do not actually bring better results in provability and where further loss tweaking is not enough.

## **Question I:**

Is there a network with **perfect accuracy** s.t. analyzing it with Box is **exact**?

## **Question I:**

Is there a network with **perfect accuracy** s.t. analyzing it with Box is **exact**?

#### Yes.

Universal Approximation with Certified Networks, ICLR'2020 Baader, Mirman, Vechev

(answers the existence question, but construction is still impractical, more work needed)

## **Question II:**

Why are better relaxations not producing better results?

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Why are better relaxations not producing better results?

Hypothesis: More complex abstractions lead to more difficult optimization problems.

Why? Intuitively, a relatively **small number of weights** in the network need to control complex relaxations with **many more parameters** (than weights). This is quite unlike normal training.

## **Question II:**

Why are better relaxations not producing better results?

We need a training method that produces a simpler optimization problem

# Reminder: optimization problems

find

where

minimize  $\rho(\theta)$ 

## Adversarial Training

## **Certified Defense**

find  $\theta$ minimize  $\rho(\theta)$ 

where

 $\rho(\theta) = \mathbf{E}_{(x,y)\sim D}[\max_{\mathbf{x}' \in S(\mathbf{x})} L(\theta, \mathbf{x}', y)]$ 

Find input x' that achieves high loss

Find output *z* that achieves high loss (under abstraction)

θ

**Good** accuracy

Worse verifiability

**Easier optimization** 

**Worse accuracy** 

 $\rho(\theta) = \mathbf{E}_{(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \sim D} \left[ \max \ L(\theta, \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{y}) \right]$ 

 $z \in NN^{\#}(S(x))$ 

**Good verifiability** 

**Harder optimization** 

#### Adversarial Training and Provable Defenses: Bridging the Gap

COLT: Balunovic and V, ICLR'20 (oral)


#### Key challenge:

Find point  $x_1 \in S_1$  such that loss *L* in the final layer is maximized Need **projections** again! COLT: stands for Convex Layerwise Adversarial Training

**Optimization problem (after layer 1):** 


 $\min_{\theta} \max_{x_1 \in S_1} L(h_3(h_2(x_1)), y_{true})$ 


(high-level view: PGD training but with shapes arising in the middle of the network)



https://github.com/eth-sri/colt

## Instantiation of COLT with Zonotope





Zonotope relaxation (reminder):  $Z = A \cdot [-1, 1]^k$ 

Each  $x \in Z$  has a corresponding  $e \in [-1, 1]^k$  such that x = Ae

## Lecture Summary

**Certified defenses:** using relaxations during training in order to obtain more provable networks

We introduced the DiffAI method and showed how to instantiate it with two loss functions and two relaxations

The DiffAI method and its follow-ups can produce complex optimization problems. Towards that, we introduced COLT, a certified defense that **combines adversarial training and relaxations to produce a simpler optimization problem** where better relaxations can lead to better results.